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The Proposed Secure Act’s
Ten-Year Mandatory
Distribution Period for
Non-Spousal Traditional
§401(k)/IRA Beneficiaries
May Not Increase
Government Revenue
By William K.S. Wang*

The House of Representatives in May 2019 passed
a bill, the ‘‘Setting Every Community Up for Retirement Enhancement (SECURE) Act of 2019,’’ which
would generally impose a 10-year mandatory distribution period for non-spousal beneficiaries of §401(k)/
IRA’s, both Roth and traditional (non-Roth).1 This 10year distribution for traditional §401(k)/IRA’s may
decrease government revenue.
A traditional §401(k)/IRA is a joint venture with
the government and may be a positive-sum game.
This is easier to understand by initially assuming a
constant flat income tax of, say, 30%. Perpetually, the
beneficiary owns 70%, and the government owns
30%. Of every dollar ever withdrawn, she gets 70
cents, and the government receives 30 cents.
Distributions from the traditional §401(k)/IRA are
not subject to ‘‘tax’’ in the conventional sense. In*
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stead, they are a partial liquidation of the joint venture with each party taking the share already owned.
Because the beneficiary’s 70% interest is never subject to tax, including on withdrawals, the 70% interest
is like a ‘‘Roth’’ within the traditional §401(k)/IRA.
The tax exemption of this ‘‘Roth’’ within is the only
tax benefit of the traditional §401(k)/IRA and may
represent a revenue loss to the government.
From the required distribution, the government’s
revenue gain, if any, is not the so-called ‘‘tax’’ on the
distribution, but any additional tax from the beneficiary who loses the tax exemption of her ‘‘Roth’’
within the traditional §401(k)/IRA and chooses to reinvest her after-‘‘tax’’ distribution in securities (or engage in trades in those securities) that generate taxable income.
The government gains no tax revenue as a result of
the distribution if the recipient employs the after‘‘tax’’ amount in various ways, including (1) spending
it, rather than reinvesting it; (2) reinvesting in her
state’s tax-exempt municipal bonds; or (3) reinvesting
in non-dividend paying stock and holding until
death’s stepped-up basis.
The 10-year compulsory drawdown may be imprudent for the government. Both owners gain from the
traditional §401(k)/IRA’s appreciation in value. When
the government withdraws part of its interest in the
joint venture and spends the so-called ‘‘revenue,’’ the
government ‘‘dissaves’’ and loses any future gains on
the amount ‘‘dissaved.’’
The government somewhat resembles the taxpayer
who liquidates and spends part of her traditional
§401(k)/IRA. Commentators and the government consider imprudent pre-retirement employee withdrawals.
If the government insists on ‘‘dissaving’’ for expenditures, instead of mandating the 10-year distribution
the government could borrow to spend. Such debt
would allow the government to retain its interest in
the §401(k)/IRA jointly owned with the non-spousal
beneficiary. If, as is likely, the §401(k)/IRA generates
a higher long-term return than the government’s cost
of borrowing, the government will benefit, just as a
homeowner profits if her home appreciates at a faster
pace than her mortgage rate.
With no obligatory 10-year distribution, the appreciation in the government’s interest in the traditional
§401(k)/IRA may exceed any tax revenue lost from a
beneficiary who would have elected to reinvest her
after-‘‘tax’’ distribution in a manner that produced
taxable income.
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The above analysis assumes a constant flat income
tax. In fact, a non-spousal beneficiary will have marginal tax brackets (the tax rate that applies to the next
dollar of income) that vary over her lifetime. Typically, an individual has income lower in his or her
early career, higher in late career, and lower in retirement. During the 10-year mandatory distribution, the
beneficiary may be in a tax bracket higher or lower
than later in life. If the inherited §401(k)/IRA is large,
a 10-year required distribution may thrust the beneficiary into a higher tax bracket. In addition, the 10year term precludes timing increased withdrawals during later periods of reduced income.
Most-likely, the 10-year required distribution will
result in beneficiaries being in higher tax brackets
than if they were able to stretch distributions over
their lifetimes.
In sum, the net revenue effect of the 10-year mandatory distribution is a result of two countervailing
factors:
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(1) the government’s loss of future profits from
its joint ventures with the beneficiaries, possibly
with the government borrowing to retain its interests, versus
(2) the government’s revenue gain from
(a) any tax on beneficiaries who choose to reinvest their after-‘‘tax’’ mandatory distributions in securities (or engage in transactions in
those securities) in a way that produces taxable
income, plus
(b) the increased tax on beneficiaries who, during the 10-year term, are in higher tax brackets
than with a lifetime distribution period.
The net result is unclear, especially with the difficulty of predicting the future investment performance
of the joint ventures. The government may be worse
off with the 10-year compulsory distribution and
should not require it.
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